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Abstract
This paper analyzes within a simple model how a removal of bank
secrecy can impact tax revenues and banksprotability, assuming that
o¤shore centers are able to o¤er sophisticated but legal, tax planning.
Two alternative regimes are considered. A rst, in which there is strict
bank secrecy and a second, where there is international information
exchange for tax purposes. In particular, we show that sharing tax
information with onshore countries can be a dominant strategy for
an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax planning. More-
over, a partial reduction of tax liabilities can already prompt OFCs
to voluntarily exchange relevant tax information. We also discuss the
conditions under which the possible removal of bank secrecy may re-
duce or increase the onshore countrys tax revenue.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, there have been numerous attacks against bank secrecy
and opaque nancial structures that have been accused of extensive tax eva-
sion (OECD 1998, FSF 2000). In the wake of the nancial crisis of 2008, an
anti-evasion action was re-launched by the G-20 that urges approximately 100
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OECD and non-OECD countries (including most O¤shore Financial Centers
- OFCs) to sign "Tax Information Exchange Agreements" (TIEAs).1 Ac-
tions were also taken unilaterally by US authorities after they accused Swiss
banks (UBS and Credit Suisse Group) of aiding tax evasion schemes. With
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of March 2010 and an
initial agreement signed between the US and Switzerland in February 2013,
events are speeding up. The FATCA agreement requires that foreign insti-
tutions report information about nancial accounts held by US taxpayers
directly to the US tax authorities. Since April 2013, ve European govern-
ments have promoted FATCA models as "the new international standard"
and have envisaged their implementation as the basis for a multilateral ex-
change of information. These actions have prompted some sizeable OFCs
(e.g., Luxembourg, BVI, Bermudas) to announce their willingness to intro-
duce an automatic information exchange. Will these actions be the end
of OFCsbusiness? Will this approach substantially mitigate tax leakages
experienced by countries pressing for more tax transparency? Which eco-
nomic forces encourage OFCs to accept the abrogation of bank secrecy on
non-resident deposits? In this paper, we use a simple model of international
banking competition to address these questions while highlighting that alter-
native legal pathways, specically tax planning, may undermine or at least
reduce the e¤ectiveness of removing banking secrecy.
In a recent report (2009), the OECD expresses concern about High Net
Worth Individuals (HNWIs) posing particular challenges to tax administra-
tions because of the complexity of their a¤airs, the amounts of tax revenue
that are at stake, and, especially, the opportunity to undertake aggressive
tax planning. Ten years ago, noting that the attractiveness of Switzerland
for tax evasion was declining, Geiger and Hürzeler (2003) explained that
Swiss banks were adapting to this development by improving, among other
abilities, expertise in international tax and estate planning instruments. The
Economist notes that Liechtenstein "is one of the more proactive" to re-
think its strategy. "It signs as many tax treaties as possible [...] and o¤ering
1More than 700 agreements were signed on August 10, 2011 (OECD 2011) between
OFCs and OECD countries. These agreements require jurisdictions to exchange informa-
tion on request without restrictions due to bank secrecy or domestic tax interest require-
ments.
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a tempting array of vehicles, including trusts".2
Interestingly, bank secrecy seems to be inessential for tax mitigation.
The nancial press abounds with statements by bankers, tax lawyers, and
tax advisers praising the various sophisticated structures that legally lower
tax bills in taxpayershome countries without depending on bank secrecy.
According to Kenneth Rubinstein (2010), a New Yorker lawyer, "secrecy has
no place in proper tax planning"; "rather than falling for promises of secrecy
from unscrupulous marketers, investors should seek guidance from qualied
tax counsel and ensure that their international assets are structured in a tax-
compliant manner". Individual investors are also inclined to use more and
more sophisticated methods that were initially created for the tax planning
of Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs). A legal means of international tax
planning for individual investors can be achieved by using special entities
in international nancial centers. In this case, we are confronted with tax
planning rather than tax evasion, although the dividing line is not always
clear (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001). According to the OECD (2009, p.26),
"Wealthy investors are often highly mobile and may be attracted to countries
perceived as o¤ering a favorable taxation environment. This may include
such factors as no or low capital gains tax on the disposition of privately
held assets and the presence of a good treaty-network. Rather than changing
their tax residence, wealthy investors may hold investments through no or
nominally taxed o¤shore entities with a view to mitigate tax on foreign source
income or gains".
Among the various international tax planning strategies, the holding cor-
poration is an interesting vehicle used by individuals and MNEs (Gravelle
2009, Mc Cann 2006, Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010). For example, Schmidt
and Lady (2007) explain in detail how US HNWIs use holding companies
and the corresponding tax rules. In particular, OFCs have designed holding
companies to exploit Double Tax Treaties (DTTs) 3 and the EU Directive
"Parent-Subsidiaries"(1990)4 that have encouraged extensive treaty shopping
(Avi-Yonah and Panayi 2010). Interestingly, there has recently been a pro-
liferation of DTTs. Rawling (2007) argues that the recent initiatives of the
2"Leaky devils. Tax havens start to reassess their business models", The Economist,
April 13, 2013.
3DTTs are agreements between two states (since the 1920s) designed to protect in-
vestors against the risk of double taxation. DTT networks have increased in parallel with
the development of foreign direct investments.
4Modied in 2003.
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OECD, the EU, and the IMF for information exchange agreements have en-
couraged bilateral DTTs as part of or separate from TIEAs, and many OFCs
have concluded DTTs that they did not previously have. Indeed, more than
3000 bilateral tax treaties connecting approximately 180 countries are in force
today (Rixen 2010, Rixen 2011). The OECD treaty model represents the gen-
eral consensus on international taxation, but the rules have become more so-
phisticated and complex over time (Rixen 2010), creating loopholes that are
exploited by low-tax jurisdictions. The EU Directive "Parent-Subsidiaries"
intends to eliminate tax obstacles to prot distribution between groups of
companies in the EU by abolishing the withholding of taxes on dividends
between subsidiaries and parents.5 To benet from these exemptions, the
parent and subsidiaries must be fully taxable, and a minimum of permanent
shareholding is required. Special entities called "conduit companies" that
exploit DTTs and the Parent-Subsidiaries Directive have seen exponential
growth during the last decade, reecting the development of tax planning.
The number of Luxembourg nancial companies, called SOPARFI 6(see Ap-
pendix), increased from 2800 in 2000 to 55 000 in 2011. Dutch nancial
holding companies were evaluated at 42 072 in 2007, and similar or compara-
ble legal vehicles exist in Cyprus, Malta, Switzerland, and Caribbean OFCs
(often called International Business Companies).
The aim of this paper is to address an issue that has attracted little atten-
tion in the current debate. If onshore countriesforemost aim is to increase
their tax revenue, it is legitimate to question whether the removal of bank
secrecy can achieve this aim given that there exist alternative, albeit sophis-
ticated, ways to mitigate the tax burden. To this end, we develop a simple
model to analyze how removing bank secrecy may a¤ect tax revenues and
banksprotability, assuming that o¤shore centers are able to o¤er sophis-
ticated but not illegal tax planning. The focus is on a small OFC that is
able to attract investors located in the rest of the world. Two regimes are
considered. In the rst scenario, we assume that the OFC enjoys strict bank
secrecy and is thus attractive to tax evaders. However, the onshore economy
is able to pressure the tax haven by shaming and blaming it. This pressure
damages its reputation in the hope of limiting tax evasion. In the second case,
we consider a scenario in which the OFC agrees to share information with
5This double taxation represented discrimination compared with a situation in which
the two entities were located in the same country.
6SOciété de PArticipation FInancière
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the onshore economy for tax purposes. Sophisticated tax planning appears
as an alternative to tax evasion. By accepting the information exchange, the
reputation of OFCs remains sound, and the onshore countries are deprived
of one weapon in the ght against tax leakages caused by legal o¤shoring
practices. In the following, we adopt a positive approach rather than a nor-
mative one by assuming that the competing jurisdictions are self-interested.
The OFC is motivated by maximizing its banksprots, whereas the onshore
government is concerned with maximizing its net tax revenue. 7
The main results obtained in this paper can be summarized as follows.
We rst show that sharing tax information with onshore countries can be
a dominant strategy for an OFC if there is enough scope for providing tax
planning to its clientele without infringing tax laws. It follows that the
willingness of an OFC to provide tax information does not necessarily lead
to its closure. Furthermore, we show that partial tax saving resulting from
o¤shore investments may prompt OFCs to voluntarily exchange relevant tax
information. The required share of tax mitigation leading to this cooperative
behavior depends on exogenous parameters, such as the level of international
nancial integration. Finally, we highlight a surprising result. We show that
the removal of bank secrecy may, under some conditions, reduce the onshore
countrys tax revenue.
Our paper is related to the recent literature on tax avoidance through
tax havens, although these contributions are mainly focused on tax plan-
ning strategies implemented by MNEs. In this context, Slemrod and Wilson
(2009) demonstrate the parasitic e¤ect of tax havens on other countrieswel-
fare. In their setting, tax havens waste resources by providing tax evasion
services to rms, and tax administrations incur expenditures to limit tax eva-
sion. Other authors (Hong and Smart, 2010; Desai, 2006), however, highlight
the benecial e¤ects of tax havens. For example, by reducing their tax bur-
dens through the use of o¤shore entities, MNEs may enhance their activity
in non-tax havens. Johannesen (2010) analyzes the e¤ect of tax havens on
low and high tax jurisdictions within a framework of imperfect competition.
In particular, he shows that an equilibrium may arise in which the tax rate
of the low tax country is increased, whereas the tax bases of non-tax havens
decrease. Elsayyad and Konrad (2012) analyze how ghting tax havens,
particularly by imposing tax information exchange agreements, modies the
7This is a suitable way to characterize the objective of onshore governments given the
current economic situation, as noted by Nicodème (2009).
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competition pattern between tax havens. If initiatives are adopted in a se-
quential way, they show that the resulting exit of some tax havens increases
the market concentration among the remaining tax havens, which become
more protable and more resistant to complying; thus, actions taken against
tax havens may be welfare reducing for the OECD. Our paper also examines
the possible adverse e¤ects caused by the reaction of tax havens to initiatives
against them. However, contrary to Elsayyad and Konrad (2012), our paper
focuses on changes within a tax haven that are more or less able to substi-
tute (legal) tax planning activities for traditional tax evasion services rather
than on changes in competition between tax havens. The o¤shore business
does not necessarily disappear with o¢ cial compliance with information ex-
change agreements, but its nature may change. Therefore, in contrast to
Johannesen (2010) and Elsayyad and Konrad (2012), we do not focus on
competition between di¤erent tax havens.
The work of Bacchetta and Espinoza (2000) bears some resemblance to
our paper. These authors derive general conditions under which two possibly
asymmetric countries may add a bilateral information-exchange clause in a
tax treaty. Analogously, our model attempts to identify conditions under
which an OFC is (unilaterally) willing to transmit tax information to a high-
tax country. Their model is based on bilateral exchange and necessitates
repeated games to make information exchange sustainable. In our paper,
however, the willingness of the OFC to cooperate can be reached in a one-
shot game because giving up bank secrecy can, under specic conditions,
make legal tax planning more protable than pure tax evasion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we model how an OFC
competes with the onshore world by providing tax benets. Within this
context, we successively consider strict bank secrecy and information sharing.
Section 3 discusses the conditions under which the OFCmay voluntarily agree
to give up bank secrecy. Then, we analyze how the possible decision of the
OFC to comply with international tax exchange rules can a¤ect the onshore
tax revenue. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model setting
Consider an OFC located in country F competing with a nancial center lo-
cated in country H. We assume that banks located in a jurisdiction compete
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in unison with banks located in another country.8 The OFC attracts investors
living in country H, whereas the reverse does not occur. Investors who reside
in the OFC are supposed to keep their capital in the OFC. This assump-
tion emphasizes that OFCs generally have very low populations and o¤er
intermediation services predominantly to large foreign (onshore) economies.
Investors of the onshore country H are heterogeneous and uniformly distrib-
uted, with unit density on the interval [0; 1] according to their attachment to
home, indexed by x. The closer an individual is to the origin, the more she
is attached to her home country. Each individual is endowed with one unit
of capital she can invest in the home banking system or in the OFC.
An individual of type x 2 [0; 1] who o¤shores her money incurs a cost
equal to a moving cost k > 0 times x. The coe¢ cient k can be viewed as a
measure of the degree of international nancial integration. The government
of country H taxes capital according to the home country principle, whereas
the OFC does not impose a tax on capital. To analyze how the OFC and the
onshore economy compete for investors, we consider two alternative regimes:
strict bank secrecy and information sharing. Under strict bank secrecy, the
OFC does not share any type of information about its clientele with country
H, whereas under the second scenario, information sharing takes place. Im-
portantly, in the second regime, legal tax planning can emerge as an alterna-
tive to tax evasion, as detailed in Section (2:2). In each regime, investors can
invest their money either at home or in the OFC. If they opt for the second
choice, two asset types are available: one in which sophisticated tax mitiga-
tion strategies are not needed and one that involves tax planning techniques.
Note that we only focus on the tax motive when investors are supposed to
o¤shore their money. Consequently, the ordinary asset will dominate the so-
phisticated asset in the case of pure bank secrecy, whereas tax planning will
dominate the ordinary asset when there is automatic information sharing for
tax purposes.
The onshore region and the OFC interact at di¤erent levels. First, in-
vestors from the onshore economy are enticed to avoid taxes by o¤shoring
their money. The ensuing tax loss induces the onshore economy to react by
setting an appropriate tax rate and deciding on actions to damage the OFCs
reputation. Second, there is competition between the banks of both countries.
8The aim is to neglect competition among banks within a joint location to focus exclu-
sively on the interaction between banking centers. Consequently, only one representative
bank for each jurisdiction will be considered.
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In this context, we assume that the interest rates o¤ered to investors result
endogenously from a non-cooperative game between both banking systems.
The consequence is that these rates reect the relative tax attractiveness of
the OFC, which, in turn, depends on the possible existence of bank secrecy
and the ease with which tax planning opportunities can be provided. 9 The
onshore government is assumed to maximize its tax revenues while anticipat-
ing (i) how investors react to di¤erences in taxes and to reputational costs
when investing in the OFC and (ii) how banks compete to attract investors.
2.1 Strict bank secrecy
Under this regime, the OFC provides strict bank secrecy to its investors while
the onshore center does not. O¤shore tax dodgers are thus supposed to be
perfectly sheltered from their home tax administration. This perfect opacity
allows tax evasion by investing in non sophisticated assets like riskless de-
posits.10 Because strict bank secrecy makes tax evasion di¢ cult to detect,
authorities of onshore countries try to make OFCs less attractive for tax eva-
sion by actions11 intended to disparage their reputation. Consequently, the
tax evaders will endure a premium that increases with the loss of reputation
(Picard and Pieretti, 2011) of the non-cooperative tax haven in which they
invest.12
Two options are then available to the H countrys resident. Either the
9That interest rates reect international taxation conditions is consistent with English
and Shahin (1994), who nd that, following the passage in the late 1980s of two laws that
e¤ectively removed banking secrecy for cases of insider trading and money laundering,
Swiss banks raised deposit rates by 53 and 105 basis points, respectively. According to
Besson (2004, p.64), Swiss banks can a¤ord to charge higher-than-average fees by virtue of
their high-end image, their reputation for nancial strength, and, nally, banking secrecy.
In addition to fees, banking secrecy a¤ects deposits rates.
10Investments in risky nancial assets could be considered. Because the focus of the
paper is exclusively on the tax aspect of o¤shore investments we shall avoid this compli-
cation.
11Recently, the ght against tax evasion has become a major priority in developed
countries and pressure (like blacklisting or blame and shame campaigns) against tax havens
has increased. These actions are intended to entice the OFC to exchange tax information.
12Indeed, Sharman (2001 p.12) observes that, "investors tend to avoid or leave jurisdic-
tions with bad reputations not only out of concern that their money will be misappropri-
ated, but also because rms risk harming their own reputations, as reected in their share
prices."
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investor puts her money in the home bank where she incurs a tax or she
evades taxes by investing in the OFC. One unit of wealth invested at home
by an individual of type x 2 [0; 1] yields
VH = rH   t;
where rH is the rate of return and t the tax rate. If the same individual
invests in the OFC, she avoids the home tax but has to incur in addition of
a reputation cost, a moving cost which reects her attachment to home and
the ease with which money can be transferred abroad.
It follows that one unit of wealth invested by the individual of type x in
the o¤shore nancial center yields a return rF diminished by the mobility
cost kx and a reputation harm . The corresponding indirect utility is given
by
VF = rF   kx  
Given the utility of the di¤erent options, the individual of type x 2 [0; 1]
chooses to invest in the country which o¤ers the highest net return. It follows
that the individuals of type x 2 [0; x) where
x =
rF   rH + t  
k
opt for tax evasion and those of type x 2 [x; 1] decide to invest at home. As
a result, the investment supply to the home banking place equals to DF = x
and the supply to the tax haven equals DH = 1  x.
International banking competition The banking systems of coun-
tries H and F raise funds from investors and o¤er respectively the interest
rates rH and rF . The collected funds by the banks are invested into risk-free
assets that yield a given (world) rate of return r. The banksprot functions
in the countries H and F are given as follows
H = (r   rH)DH and F = (r   rF )DF :
Each banking center selects its return rate supposing that the rate of its rival
is given. The equilibrium rates are
rH = r   2k   t+ 
3
and rF = r   k + t  
3
:
The corresponding deposits supplied at home and abroad are respectively
DH =
2k   t+ 
3k
and DF =
k + t  
3k
:
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Onshore government decision We suppose that the investors repu-
tation harm is a policy variable that depends on the pressure that the onshore
jurisdiction is able to exert place on the OFC, for example, by blacklisting
or campaigning about the risks of tax evasion. We further consider that
the cost of exerting pressure is given by a quadratic function C() = 2=2.
The convexity of the cost function may reect the increasing di¢ culty to
exert pressure which can in particular rely on the existence of institutional
limitations. For example, a successful crackdown on bank secrecy requires
collective action of onshore jurisdictions which can be hard to sustain or can
lead to unacceptable infringement on the sovereignty of other states. Finally,
we assume that policy makers of the home country maximize their net tax
income TEH (t; ) = tDH   C() with respect to the tax rate t and the pres-
sure variable . This way to characterize the onshore governments objective
is consistent with the current period of global crisis forcing countries to x
their scal imbalances (Nicodème, 2009). Solving the maximization problem
yields the equilibrium values
 =
2k
6k   1 (1)
and
t = k +

2
=
6k2
6k   1 (2)
with t < 1 , 1=5 < k < 3=4, which guaranty the positivity of  and t:
Financial integration, captured by k; impacts the optimal tax rate directly
and indirectly through its e¤ect on . More precisely, two opposing forces
are at play. An increasing mobility cost k augments directly taxation because
taxpayers become more captive, but it lowers indirectly taxation because a
higher cost to o¤shore savings implies lower international pressure. This
explains why the e¤ect of k on t is not monotone. A higher k yields a
higher tax rate if k > 1=3; whereas a higher k induces lower taxation if
k < 1=3: In the rst case, the direct e¤ect dominates, while the indirect
e¤ect dominates in the second case. The two forces equalize at k = 1=3:
Using (1) and (2), the equilibrium deposit supplies become
DH =
2k
6k   1 and D

F =
4k   1
6k   1 :
The supplies are positively signed if k > 1=4. It follows that if k  1=4
there is no tax evasion (DF = 0). The reason is that capital mobility in this
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interval encourages the onshore government to pressure the uncooperative
tax haven to such an extent that investors apprehend tax evasion because of
very high reputation costs. The equilibrium interest rates are
rH = r  
2k2
6k   1 and r

F = r   k
4k   1
6k   1 :
Because the OFC o¤ers tax shelter, one could expect that the interest rate
is always higher in the onshore banking center. This is however not always
the case. Indeed, we have rH < r

F if k < 1=2 and r

H > r

F ; if k > 1=2. When
nancial integration is high , i.e. k < 1=2; international pressure  is high to
counteract tax evasion and thus investors become more reluctant to o¤shore
their money. This prompts the onshore bank to o¤er a lower interest rate
than its o¤shore rival.
The corresponding equilibrium prots are given by
H =
4k3
(6k   1)2 and 

F =
k (4k   1)2
(6k   1)2
The net tax income BH = TH   2=2 of the onshore country is
BH =
2k2
6k   1
It is straightforward to show that BH =
1
3
t. This implies that at equi-
librium, the net tax revenue of the onshore country BH increases with the
mobility cost if k > 1=3 but decreases with k if 1
4
< k < 1
3
.
The equilibrium global income of the onshore country is
BH + 

H = B

H
8k   1
6k   1
2.2 Tax information sharing
Now, consider that the OFC provides tax information exchange to the on-
shore economy according to internationally accepted standards.13 Conse-
13Due to the OECD, information exchange "on request" remains the "internationally
agreed standard". However, the G20 leaders at their June 2012 summit in Mexico com-
mitted to lead by example in implementing the practice of the automatic exchange of tax
information. In April 2013, ve European governments decided to impose the automatic
exchange.
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quently, sophisticated tax planning is an alternative to tax evasion. It fol-
lows that strict bank secrecy is no longer necessary for tax mitigation. In
addition to the existence of home investments, we assume there are two ways
of placing savings o¤shore. One way is a riskless o¤shore-deposit subject to
residence-based taxation, and the second is opting for a complex investment
strategy that allows tax to be saved.
In the rst case, an individual of type x living in country H earns a rate
of return rlF . After taking into account of a moving cost kx and a unit tax
rate of t due to her home country according to bilateral agreements, the net
return equals V lF = r
l
F   kx  t.
In the second case, the investor can benet from a tax reduction equal
to b (0 < b < 1) times the tax rate t imposed by the (onshore) country of
residence. It follows that the closer b to its upper limit, the more e¤ective
the tax planning . Simultaneously, we assume that b is increasing with the
degree of sophistication of tax planning. In fact, e¤ectiveness and sophisti-
cation are both dependent on the level of accounting skills and the quality
of legal and nancial advice provided to investors as well as the ability and
competence to manage mobile capital inows (McLaren and Passant, 2010).
However, beneting from sophisticated tax planning techniques is not risk
free for investors. The more complex these structures are, the more di¢ cult
it is to draw a dividing line between abusive tax avoidance and acceptable
tax planning or tax minimization (Du¤, 2009).14 Consequently, the legal
uncertainty we have highlighted creates a risk specic to tax planning that
rises as sophistication increases. It follows that the return of complex in-
vestment structures can be considered a random variable ersF . For reasons of
tractability, we assume that the investor has an exponential utility 15 over
14It follows that investors choosing highly complex tax planning structures are likely
to be exposed to courts that may view these practices as abusive. However, the limits of
the legality of tax planning are not invariably provided. According to Du¤ (2009), the in-
crease of tax avoidance activity over the past decades has prompted governments to adopt
legislative and administrative measures to discourage this phenomenon. Nevertheless, the
legality of these anti-avoidance rules is questionable. As Kessler and Eicke (2007) note,
the issue of whether anti-treaty-shopping and anti-avoidance rules are in accordance with
EC law remains open. Evers and de Graaf (2009), analyzing the decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, show that European Member States have substantial discretion
with regard to combating articial arrangements that are intended to minimize taxation
on capital payments and/or capital gains.
15Investors are risk-averse and their utility is given by U(~r) = 1  e xers , where x is the
constant absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient.
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the return ersF which is normally distributed .16 We also consider that the
investors in the home country are ranked uniformly with unit density on the
interval [0; 1] according to their risk aversion. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that this risk is ranked in the same manner as the home attachment.
In other words, the variable x can also be used to dene investorsrisk aver-
sion. Consequently, the expected utility of an investor of type x who opts
for tax planning is given by E [U(ersF )] v rsF   122x. Note that the variance
2 represents the risk associated with tax planning, which, as we explained,
increases with its level of sophistication. As highlighted above, the parameter
b is also supposed to increase with the complexity of tax planning. It fol-
lows that the parameters 2 and b move in the same direction. We therefore
write 2 = 2b where  is a policy parameter which reects in particular how
robust and resolute anti-tax haven regulations are.
Hence, the indirect utility can be written as follows
V sF = r
s
F   bx  kx  (1  b)t
Being confronted with di¤erent alternatives, the individual of type x 2 [0; 1]
chooses to invest in the country which o¤ers the highest net return. It follows
that the individuals of type x 2 [0; x1) ; where
x1 =
rsF   rlF + bt
b
opt for tax planning. Individuals of type x 2 (x2; 1] where x2 = r
l
F rH t
k
invest their money in their home country. Finally, individuals of type x 2
[x1; x2) o¤shore their money and pay taxes in their home country. Country
F investors place a share bDH of their savings at home. The rest is invested
abroad in non risky assets DlF and/or sophisticated assets D
s
F :
DsF = x1; D
l
F = (x2   x1) and bDH = 1  x2
We now derive the equilibrium interest and tax rates when the OFC complies
to international accepted information exchange standards.
16More exactly, the investorsgross return follows a normal distribution of mean rsF =
E(ersF ) and variance 2:
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International banking competition The onshore bank maximizes
its prot by choosing rH and considers its rivals rate as given. Its prot
equals
H = (r   rH) bDH :
The o¤shore banking center maximizes its prot by choosing rlF and r
s
F ,while
considering rH as given. Its prot function is
F = (r   rlF )DlF + (R  rsF )DsF ;
whereR is the bankersrate of return for the sophisticated type of investment.
We assume that R equals the basic world interest rate r augmented by a fee
which is proportional to the complexity of tax planning. In other words, we
write R = r + b where  > 0.
The onshore governmentdecision The onshore government chooses
the tax rate t that maximizes
TH = t
h bDH +DlF + (1  b)DsFi
This yields the equilibrium tax rate
t =

b
  
2
(3)
It follows that the equilibrium tax rate decreases with b and . The
intuition is straightforward. If tax planning becomes more attractive (b in-
creases) and/or the rate of return of sophisticated assets improves following
an increase in , the onshore administration will react by reducing the tax
burden to reduce capital outows. It also appears that the tax rate in-
creases with . The reason is that a tougher anti tax haven policy (increased
) which increases the risk associated with tax planning raises the onshore
jurisdictions power to tax. Note also that the condition 1 > t > 0 is satised
if  2  b
2
; b
2
+ b

. The equilibrium return rates o¤ered to the investors in
their in the OFC and in their home country are
rsF = R 


2
+
k
3
+
1
4
b

; rlF = r  
k
3
and rH = r   2k
3
We assume that r is high enough so that the margins of the di¤erent types of
investments are always positive. Surprisingly the interest rate o¤ered by the
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o¤shore center decreases with the risk parameter : As highlighted above, an
increase in  raises the tax rate t which makes tax planning more attractive.
This nally explains why the o¤shore nancial center is able to lower its
interest rate. The equilibrium investments choices are
D
s
F =
1
3
; D
l
F = 0 and DH =
2
3
:
The banksequilibrium prots are
F = (R  rsF )D
s
F =
4k + 6 + 3b
36
and H =
4k
9
:
The equilibrium tax income of the onshore economy equals
TH =
(2   b) (3  b)
6b
Notice the tax revenue in the onshore country augments with . It follows
that making tax planning more risky improves the onshore countrys tax
revenue.
3 Removing bank secrecy
In the following we analyze the incentives of an OFC to voluntarily disclose
tax information. Then we focus on how the removal of bank secrecy impacts
the tax revenue in the onshore country.
3.1 Incentives to provide tax information
In this section, we consider the conditions under which the o¤shore center
has an incentive to abandon bank secrecy and to comply with international
information sharing rules. We assume that the OFC chooses the regime
that entails the highest bank protability. For this reason, we focus on the
di¤erence F   F which equals
	(b; k; ) =
1
12
b+

1
9
k +
1
6
   F

It follows that 	(b; k; ) > 0 if b > bb where bb = 12

F   23 (2k + 3) :We can
state the following proposition.
15
Proposition 1 If the share of tax benet b is high enough (b > bb), the OFC
has an incentive to accept information sharing for tax purpose only.
A direct implication of this proposition is that the willingness of an OFC
to provide tax information does not necessarily lead to its closure. This is
because the OFC may be able to set up legal structures designed to provide
tax planning as an alternative to illegal tax evasion. However, the threshold
beyond which the OFC agrees to comply with tax information regulations is
not immutable. In particular, it changes with the risk parameter , which
is particularly inuenced by anti-avoidance tax rules designed by onshore
governments and k, the level of international nancial integration.
First, we see that the threshold value bb decreases with . In other words,
it is more likely that the OFC will cooperate by exchanging tax information
when tax planning becomes riskier. This is a surprising result because one
would expect that riskier tax planning would decrease the willingness of the
OFC to give up bank secrecy. This issue becomes clearer, however, if we
bear in mind that an increase in  makes investors more reluctant to o¤shore
their money, which, in turn, gives the onshore government more power to tax
and the onshore banks more liberty to lower interest rates. As a result, the
OFC also has an incentive to lower the return it o¤ers to tax planners if the
elasticity of the investment supply it faces is su¢ ciently low, as is the case
in our model17. Finally, tax planning becomes more protable for o¤shore
banks, and the OFC is thus more inclined to opt for information sharing.
Corollary: The riskier the tax planning, the likelier the o¤shore center
will agree to share tax information.
How does increasing capital mobility a¤ect the OFCs decision to aban-
don bank secrecy? Because increasing nancial openness (lower k) decreases
banksprots in each scenario, it follows that the total e¤ect of k on the
di¤erence F   F and, hence, on the threshold value bb is ambiguous. In-
deed, when k > k we have @bb
@k
> 0; and @bb
@k
< 0 otherwise. This means that
decreasing mobility costs (higher mobility) make the OFC more willing to
abandon bank secrecy when mobility costs are high ( k > k). However, when
mobility costs are low (k < k), we have the opposite e¤ect. In the rst case (
k > k), more intense international competition forces banks to increase their
17Remember that in our model the equilibrium demand for tax planning is independent
of the o¤ered return.
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interest rates, which damages the protability of the o¤shore banks relatively
more when they provide strict bank secrecy. However, when capital mobility
is high (k < k), the onshore jurisdiction exerts considerable e¤ort to damage
the OFCs reputation. As we saw above, this raises the onshore tax rate
signicantly. Accordingly, the OFC can maintain its attractiveness without
signicantly increasing its interest rate. Consequently, higher capital mobil-
ity damages its protability comparatively less in the case of bank secrecy.
The OFC is therefore less willing to lift its bank secrecy.
3.2 Does information sharing always improve onshore
tax revenue ?
Before analysing how a possible removal of bank secrecy a¤ects the tax rev-
enue of the onshore country, it is interesting to highlight some surprising
results. Our model shows that the regime of information sharing compared
with strict bank secrecy may be consistent with higher o¤shore investments
(D
s
F > D

F ) if capital mobility is high enough (k < 1=3), and with a lower
tax rate for appropriate parameter values.18 Hence, switching to information
sharing can entail ambiguous e¤ects on the onshore countrys budget. Let
us now analyze in more detail the highlighted e¤ects. Toward this end, we
dene the following (b; k; ) = TH  BH , which equals
(b; k; ) =
(2   b) (3  b)
6b
 BH =
1
6b
 
b2   (6BH + 2 + 3) b+ 6

:
Solving the equality (b; k; ) = 0 for b, we show in Appendix 2 that
there is only one real root denoted by b that satises the condition b 2 [0; 1].
It follows that (b; k; ) > 0 for b 2 0; b. In other words, if the tax benet
measured by b exceeds the threshold b, we obtain (b; k; ) < 0.
This leads us to the following proposition
Proposition 2 Information sharing increases onshore tax revenues if and
only if the tax benet resulting from tax planning is not too high (b < b).
18Indeed, direct comparison (3) and (2) shows that the di¤erence t  t = 6 k26k 1   t has
two complex roots if 2 bb <
4
3 .
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The above analysis shows that the e¤ectiveness of tax planning for reduc-
ing tax liabilities is crucial in gauging the success of the regime of information
exchange. In particular, if tax havens are su¢ ciently skilled at setting up
legal structures for tax optimization purposes, pushing for the removal of
bank secrecy with the aim of maximizing tax income may be inconsistent.
This aspect has been neglected in the current scientic and political debate.
However, the threshold value b can be increased if the onshore world is able
to augment the risk parameter , because @b
@
> 0. This can occur if onshore
governments are able to improve international tax legislation to deter the use
of increasingly sophisticated forms of tax avoidance.
It is also interesting to observe how nancial integration modies the
threshold b beyond which the regime of information sharing is not desirable
for a tax-maximizing country. To this end, we calculate the derivative of b
with respect to k. This yields @b
@k
> 0 if 1
4
< k < 1
3
and @b
@k
< 0 if k > 1
3
. In
other words, when mobility costs are "low" (1
4
< k < 1
3
), greater nancial
integration makes the regime of information exchange less attractive to the
onshore country. However, when mobility costs are "high" (k > 1
3
), we ob-
serve the opposite e¤ect. How can we explain this result ? Because TH does
not depend on k, changes in capital mobility only impact tax revenue in the
bank secrecy regime. In Section 2.1., we saw that a change in mobility costs
has an ambiguous e¤ect on the tax rate and thus on the tax revenue of the on-
shore county. When capital mobility is high (1
4
< k < 1
3
), a further decrease
in moving costs improves tax revenue in the bank secrecy regime19, but the
opposite e¤ect occurs when capital mobility is low (k > 1
3
). Consequently,
increased capital mobility makes the information exchange regime less attrac-
tive from the point of view of tax revenue in the rst case and more attractive
in the second case. That the onshore country may be worse o¤ in terms of
tax revenue is initially surprising. However, it is important to keep in mind
that by agreeing to exchange information, the OFC is no longer exposed to
international pressures aimed at damaging its reputation. Accordingly, the
onshore country lacks an important weapon in the ght against tax leak-
19In Section 2.1., we saw that in the case of bank secrecy, the tax rate and, thus,
the tax revenue are subject to two opposing forces when mobility costs change. When
capital mobility increases (k decreases), there is a rst action that lowers tax revenue
because taxpayers become less captive. In addition, there is a second action that raises
tax revenue because onshore governments strengthen their campaign against tax havens
and make investors more reluctant to o¤shore their money. The second force is dominant
when capital mobility is high ( 14 < k <
1
3 ).
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ages caused by legal o¤shoring practices. As noted by Rawlings (2007, p.58),
"Through complying with these initiatives OFC states have reinscribed their
reputation and political soundness in the eyes of investors and have become
jurisdictions characterized by good governancemeeting the highest inter-
national standards [....] These multilateral initiatives have had the reverse
e¤ect of what they originally intended: through allowing OFCs to demon-
strate their good governance to the world they maintain their client base and
sustain an ongoing scal competition between states for tax revenues".
4 Conclusion
We observe that although there is a crackdown on bank secrecy that favors
tax evasion, tax planning using sophisticated legal structures continues to
prosper. Most of these techniques, which were initially designed for multi-
national corporations, are generally based on a network of international tax
treaties. Thus, they allow wealth management, which utilizes large groups
of tax consultants, to mitigate tax liabilities without bank secrecy.
Our paper models competition between OFCs and onshore banking cen-
ters by considering, successively, strict bank secrecy with pure tax evasion
and tax information exchange with tax planning. Two interesting results
are highlighted. First, an OFC can voluntarily abandon strict bank secrecy
without closing down its activity. This decision hinges on the ability of the
OFC to o¤er tax benets by legal but sophisticated means. The model de-
nes a parameter to capture this ability that must exceed a given level. In
particular, this threshold depends on the legal uncertainty resulting from ef-
forts deployed by onshore countries and/or international bodies to rene and
implement anti-avoidance regulations. Surprisingly, the model shows that
under conditions of high capital mobility, these attempts can make OFCs
less prone to abandon strict bank secrecy. Second, it may occur that tax
revenue earned by onshore countries shrinks with the removal of strict bank
secrecy if OFCs are able to su¢ ciently and legally reduce the tax liabili-
ties of their customers. This threshold can be increased, but not necessarily
eliminated, by strengthening international regulations. This surprising result
indicates a possible inconsistency in the e¤ort of onshore countries pushing
tax havens to exchange relevant tax information for exclusively scal goals.
It follows that solely targeting the abolition of strict bank secrecy may not
be enough. Combating bank secrecy policy is a complex task that requires a
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clear understanding of modern OFCs and their capacity to adapt their tax
minimization strategies to ever-changing regulatory environments. However,
this ability to implement increasingly sophisticated tax planning devices is
not shared equally. Thus, there is scope for vertical di¤erentiation among
the various OFCs with the eventual possibility that some of them will have
to close. Our model does not account for this extension, which should be
addressed in a future work. Furthermore, the objectives that guide onshore
countries in their ght against tax havens should be claried. Are tax equity
considerations the only intentions pursued? Or, as the facts suggest, do
onshore countries primarily want to increase their tax revenue? Addressing
this second objective is likely to impact important strategic variables such as
taxes and, in turn, to induce the types of results highlighted in our paper.
Appendix 1: Example of international tax plan-
ning
Here, we show how tax planning is made possible without the existence of
bank secrecy. To this end, we illustrate (see Figure below) how tax struc-
turing can be achieved within the Luxembourg nancial holding company
SOPARFI (Société de participation nancière). Similar or comparable legal
vehicles exist in Cyprus, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, Malta, the
Netherlands Antilles, and Barbados. The SOPARFI is basically a taxable
Luxembourg company and is thus eligible to benet from DTTs and the EU
Parent-Subsidiaries directive. The main activity of a SOPARFI is to acquire
and hold shares of other companies.
Let us envisage a simplied example of tax planning for an individual
investor. An individual investor founds a SOPARFI in Luxembourg that ac-
quires corporate shares owned by the founding investor in an onshore country
(France, for example). The corporate income of the French company is taxed
at a normal rate (34.4%, including social contributions). If the investor per-
ceives dividends directly in France, he will be subject to a withholding tax on
dividends (31.5%, including social contributions). In our case, the dividend
is perceived by the Luxembourg SOPARFI, which benets from an exten-
sive network of double-taxation treaties and from the EU Parent-Subsidiary
directive. Consequently, the dividends must be paid in Luxembourg, where
the normal withholding tax rate equals 15%.
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Further tax mitigation options are available in Luxembourg. For example,
the dividends can be invested in a "Special Investment Fund" (SIF) dedicated
to professionals and other well-informed investors. The SIF is entitled to
full-tax exemption, except that it must pay a small subscription fee and an
annual charge of 0.01% on all its assets. Another possibility for a SOPARFI
to avoid withholding taxation is to transfer the dividend income to a nancial
company in another low-tax jurisdiction. In this case, the Luxembourg tax
authorities require that the foreign tax rate be at least 11%. Furthermore,
the SOPARFI can avoid the withholding tax by indebting itself to another
nancial company owned by the founder of the SOPARFI. This avoidance
scheme is facilitated by the fact that a high debt-equity ratio (85/15) is
generally acceptable to the Luxembourg tax authorities for a shareholding
activity. It follows that high debt contracting is allowed, and the resulting
interest paid is tax deductible without being subject to a withholding tax.
Finally, the nancial prots of the SOPARFI can be invested in real estate
or used for various purchases in another country or in the origin country.
Appendix 2
Solving (b; k; ) = 0 with respect to b yields the real roots of (b; k; ) =
1
6b
(b2   (6BH + 2 + 3) b+ 6) = 0 are
b =
1
2

6B + 2 + 3  
q
24B + 36B + 36B2 + (2   3)2

b =
1
2

6B + 2 + 3 +
q
24B + 36B + 36B2 + (2   3)2

It is easy to check that b > 1 since BH and  are strictly positive. It also
appears that b > 0 . In addition, we have b  1 if BH 
 
2 
3

, which is
always the case since we assume that  2  b
2
; b
2
+ b

. It follows that b is
the only admissible root of (b; k; ) = 0 satisfying the condition b 2 [0; 1].
As a consequence, (b; k; ) > 0 if b < b and (b; k; ) < 0 otherwise.
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